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<ctwst>The New Cuban American Politics 
<cs>Passion, Affection, Dollars, and the Emergence of MiHavana1 
<ca>Damián Fernández 
<txt>Much has been written about the impact of Cuban Americans 
on U.S. policy toward Cuba. From scholarly and journalistic 
accounts a portrait emerges of a single-minded ethnic enclave 
whose power has commandeered (some would say hijacked) 
Washington’s decisions vis-à-vis the island. The geographic 
heart of the politics shaping U.S. relations with Cuba is the 
city whose name has become code for Cuban American control: 
Miami. To say Miami is to say Cuban Americans.1 Both terms are 
interchangeable in the public imaginary; both carry multiple, 
and at times paradoxical, connotations. Power and geography have 
thus converged in a manner that seems to doom U.S.-Cuba 
relations to physical and political immutability. Geography 
becomes political destiny. But is it? And if so, is it as fixed 
as landmasses? Does the political geography of South Florida 
condemn U.S.-Cuba relations to continuity? 
 While the policy circuit between Havana and Washington 
usually runs through Miami, it would be an error in judgment not 
to note the alternating currents flowing through it over time.2 
Geographic dimensions, including demographic concentration of 
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the ethnic group in South Florida, have been necessary 
conditions to explain the decisive role Cuban Americans have 
played in U.S. foreign policy, but they are far from sufficient 
to explain the group’s capacity for political influence or the 
variations thereof. Particularly in the past decade, significant 
shifts in social and political patterns have taken place in 
South Florida--some of which point to greater direct connections 
between the region and the island, an emerging network that 
excludes Washington.3 As Miami and its Cuban American population 
have changed, so has the outlook for relations with Cuba. The 
city is no longer the same place it was in the 1980s or 1990s. 
Although Cuban Americans continue to hold significant power in 
political and economic sectors, Greater Miami is not exclusively 
a Cuban enclave. It is now a pan-Latin entrepôt, the gateway to 
the Americas, and with aspirations of becoming a global city.4 
The Latinization of Miami and the city’s expanded financial role 
would argue for relations with Cuba sometime in the future. 
Moreover, the social and demographic profile of the Cuban 
American community has experienced significant shifts in the 
past decades, resulting in redefined political contours that 
point to a new outlook as well. In tandem with exogenous 
factors, both national and international in scale, endogenous 
changes within Cuban Miami are ushering in a new era in the 
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history of Cuban-U.S. relations. A new regional political, 
cultural, and economic geography is in the making. 
<a>Explaining Cuban American Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy 
<txt>Cuban American influence over U.S. policy came of age in 
1980 with the establishment of the Cuban American National 
Foundation (CANF) under the leadership of Jorge Mas Canosa, a 
wealthy Miami businessman.5 The early 1980s were propitious for 
the Cuban American lobby. The advent of Ronald Reagan’s 
presidency at the beginning of the decade opened the ideological 
doors to Cuban Americans who supported the president and who 
were aligned firmly with his cold war redux. By that time Cubans 
in Miami had garnered the economic and local political clout 
that enabled them to follow the Jewish example and become a 
major ethnic lobby group, specifically in the foreign policy 
arena.6 
 The success of the Cuban American effort can be explained 
by four interrelated factors operating in tandem: 
<list1>{b} Convergence with the presidential worldview: 
Cuban Americans were staunch supporters of President Reagan’s 
international policies, especially his global anticommunist 
crusades. As a result, not only did they find a warm reception 
in the White House for their Cuban cause, but CANF lobbied in 
favor of a number of other foreign policy issues on the 
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president’s agenda, including U.S. involvement in the Central 
American conflicts.7 
<list>{b} Geographic concentration, single-issue constituency, 
and a one-party minority: The political “trifecta” of geographic 
concentration of a single-issue constituency with broad partisan 
uniformity has tended to exaggerate the perception of Cuban 
American power. Their demographic concentration in South Florida 
gave the group electoral influence that was perceived as 
critical to win office, even at the national level.8 Politicians 
of all stripes courted Cuban American votes; to do so, they had 
to toe a hard line toward the Castro regime--the political 
litmus test that all politicians had to pass with flying colors. 
Cuban Americans’ overwhelming predilection for the Republican 
Party (due to its hawkish disposition in international affairs 
and the Kennedy administration’s blunders in the failed Bay of 
Pigs invasion) provided them with a partisan foothold that 
served them well. The Republican Party of South Florida, in need 
of new blood in the 1970s and 1980s, welcomed Cuban Americans 
and embraced their cause. Eventually three Cuban Americans from 
Miami and one from New Jersey (a Democrat) would serve in the 
U.S. Congress.9 Despite the group's overwhelming Republicanism,2 
politicians of all stripes courted Cuban American voters. To do 
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so, they had to support the U.S. embargo and oppose 
normalization of relations. 
<list>{b} The politics of passion: In Cuban American political 
culture no other issue has mustered the emotional charge that 
relations with Cuba has. Such intensity is at the heart of the 
politics of passion. The politics of passion is a manner of 
relating to political issues that are deemed foundational, 
moral, and absolute--never to be compromised.10 The politics of 
passion vests politics with ethical transcendence by converting 
the mundane into a Manichaean struggle for the ultimate good. 
This sort of passion can be leveraged as a source of political 
capital insofar as it can be deployed effectively to mobilize 
groups and to channel resources toward a particular goal. 
<list2>{b} Effective lobbying strategy and the power of the 
dollar: While motivated by passion, CANF (and its political 
action committee) was a pragmatic lobby that established a 
strong organization which partnered with other groups, stayed on 
message, supported the president on a number of political 
fronts, and made financial contributions to leaders on both 
sides of the congressional aisle. Under the leadership of Jorge 
Mas Canosa, a master at combining pragmatism with passion, CANF 
was guaranteed to be effective. However, barring the economic 
gains of Cuban Americans, specifically the financial wherewithal 
of the businessmen who created CANF and their generous 
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contributions to the organization and political campaigns, the 
efforts of the group would not have mounted to much. In sum, 
CANF became a consummate player in the political lobby game by 
mixing passion with dollars and effective organization.11 
<txt> These four factors in tandem explain the relative 
success the Cuban American lobby garnered in a relatively short 
time. But success came at a cost. The public perceived, rightly 
or wrongly, that U.S. policy toward Cuba was in the grip of 
Cubans from Miami, an image which Cuban Americans themselves 
were eager to exploit for political purposes. The image of power 
became, itself, quite powerful. 
<a>The Paradox of Control 
<txt>Over time Cuban Americans became represented in paradoxical 
terms of control. On the one hand, this paradox of control 
depicts the Cuban American community as an all-powerful 
political actor that holds the reins of decision making in U.S. 
policy toward Cuba. From this vantage point the community is in 
control of the decision to isolate and pressure Cuba through the 
embargo and other punitive measures. Cuban Americans, crafty 
masters of the lobby game, hijacked U.S. foreign policy. If it 
were not for their political influence, Washington would be free 
to alter its course vis-à-vis Havana in a rational and prudent 
direction that would better serve the national interest. The 
only force keeping the United States from normalizing its 
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relations with Cuba after the cold war is the recalcitrant Cuban 
American minority in South Florida. Miami is the locus of power 
brokerage. To get to Havana from Washington, one must pass 
through Miami. But the Cuban American gatekeepers do not allow 
reformers of the status quo to pass through. They are firmly in 
control.12 
 On the other hand, the paradox of control portrays Cuban 
Americans as being out of control, teetering at the edge of 
irrationality, incivility, and un-American-ness.3 Operating on 
the border of America, Miami, they are trigger-happy, ready to 
shoot down anyone who opposes their position on U.S.-Cuba 
relations. They are all too eager to take to the streets, to 
bend the rules of the political game, and to act in an uncivil 
manner that approximates derangement. From this perspective, 
Cuban Americans seem to be driven by an illogical (and even un-
American) passion that challenges law and order, undermining the 
American way.13 Miami is the new frontier where civilization and 
barbarism encounter each other--Miami is not America. Because of 
Cuban Americans, Miami is out of control. To get Miami back, 
Cuban Americans must be put in their place. 
 Both sides of the paradox represent Cuban Americans as 
monolithic and omnipotent--a force to be reckoned with, to be 
challenged and reined in. The paradox of control ironically 
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extends the power of Cuban Americans, who loom very large on the 
screen of U.S. politics. As with all stereotypes and paradoxes, 
elements of truth reside in these interpretations, but both 
sides of the paradox of control neglect the steady dynamics of 
change within the Cuban American community. 
<a>Sources of Change 
<txt>The pillars of Cuban American power have experienced 
alterations that are threatening their foundations. During the 
past fifteen years, a significant process of transformation has 
been unfolding in the Cuban American community, resulting in 
significant demographic, political, and cultural shifts. The 
factors propelling the shifts are both endogenous and exogenous 
to Cuban Miami. The result is that the traditional politics of 
passion of the Cuban exiles is eroding slowly, being replaced by 
the politics of affection and the politics of the dollar. By the 
politics of passion I am referring to the tendency in Cuban and 
Cuban American political culture to define politics as a 
struggle between good and evil, a battle for absolute moral ends 
within a polarized postrevolutionary context. Although this 
Manichaean proclivity predates the 1959 revolution, it has 
thrived since the revolution and is typical of exile politics. 
The politics of passion finds fertile ground in polarized 
settings, such as the one that has permeated U.S.-Cuban 
relations and Cuban<n>Cuban American affairs.14 
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 A number of factors point to a softening of passion and a 
strengthening of the politics of affection--the functional 
connections and affective networks binding families and friends 
across the Florida Straits--and to the advent of the politics of 
the dollar. With increased commerce between the United States 
and Cuba, the rise of U.S. business lobby groups as important 
political actors interested in Cuba, and the hundreds of 
millions of dollars in remittances flowing from families in 
South Florida to loved ones on the island, the politics of the 
dollar are starting to play a role in defining U.S.-Cuban 
relations. While passion is fading, the politics of affection 
and the dollar are flourishing, ushering in a transformation of 
Cuban American politics. Nowhere else are these changes as 
evident as in Miami. In fact, Miami (and Cuban American 
politics) have changed more than official policies in Washington 
or Havana. Surprising as it may seem, Miami and Cuban Americans 
are at the vanguard of change in U.S.-Cuba relations. 
<a>After All These Years: Fading Passion 
<txt>Old political forces are passing and new ones are venturing 
onto the U.S.-Cuban bicoastal landscape. The patriarchs of Cuban 
and Cuban American politics are dead or dying. With the exit of 
Jorge Mas Canosa from the Cuban American scene and the near 
retirement of Fidel Castro, a real and symbolic changing of the 
guards has occurred.15 With biology taking its toll, a younger 
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crop of leaders has emerged, fissures have erupted in once 
seemingly monolithic elites, and generational cleavages have 
surfaced. Alternatives to the traditional policy prescriptions 
have come to the fore. 
 The disappearance of the patriarchs who toed the extremist 
line of confrontation opened the way for relatively moderate 
leadership and for new power contenders to unfurl the banners of 
alternative policies. After Mas Canosa’s death, CANF split into 
a hard-line faction (The Cuba Liberty Council) and a moderate 
one that kept the name of the foundation and is at the helm of 
the organization.16 Without charismatic leaders flaming the fire, 
the politics of passion tends to flicker and become difficult to 
sustain (this has taken place in the diaspora as well as on the 
island). In some quarters--especially older cohorts--passion 
still rules. Given the right conditions, a minority can always 
try to reignite the fires of passion. 
 The CANF, once the preeminent and hegemonic organization, 
now has to compete with both hard-{#}and soft-line 
organizations. It no longer commands the dominant position it 
once did. New groups that advocate for a pragmatic line of 
critical engagement with the island have been formed, such as 
the Cuba Study Group.17 The founders of the Cuba Study Group are 
from the same elite sector that founded CANF--businessmen and 
wealthy professionals--reflecting a split in the political and 
Deleted: towed
Deleted: the Cuban American 
National Foundation
Deleted: , which advocate for 
a pragmatic line of critical 
engagement with the island
Deleted: CSG 
economic elite of Cuban Miami. A series of polls have shown that 
a generational shift is also occurring. Younger Cuban Americans 
express more divergent political positions than their older co-
ethnics. The younger cohorts are less likely to support the 
embargo and less likely to base their vote in local elections on 
the Cuba issue.18 The younger generations have formed a number of 
political organizations that challenge the influence of CANF and 
of the older generations. Raíces de Esperanza,4 for example, 
brings together young Cuban professionals and students from a 
wide range of the political spectrum. The group fosters 
connections with counterparts on the island and embraces a 
multiplicity of perspectives regarding policy choices. Raíces 
epitomizes a different manner of conducting politics in Cuban 
Miami.19 Like other organizations, Raíces has learned a lesson 
from CANF: how important it is to lobby Washington, although 
Raíces’ primary focus is not necessarily the White House or 
Congress, but the people of Cuba. 
 During the past years the focus of attention of Cuban 
American organizations, including CANF, has shifted. Although 
they have not abandoned lobbying on Capitol Hill, they have 
redirected time, effort, and resources to political actors 
inside Cuba. The center of gravity of Cuban American politics 
has shifted as a result, from Washington to Havana. Again Cuban 
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Miami is at the forefront of this change. The community is 
engaging increasingly with their fellow Cubans on the island in 
multiple ways--economic, political, social, cultural, and 
personal. 
 All Cuban American political groups have found partners 
inside Cuba, including, but not exclusively, among the dissident 
and human rights organizations that have sprouted there since 
the 1980s. This reorientation in the focus and locus of politics 
is not to be underestimated, for it signals that change in Cuba 
can come from within, not from without. This recent realization 
tends to marginalize Washington. To get to Cuba, Miamians do not 
need to go to Washington first. From the perspective of many 
Cuban Americans, Washington no longer holds the key, or at least 
not the only one, to unlock the future of the island nation. 
Relations with Congress and the White House are not the sine qua 
non of effective political organizing that they used to be; 
political connections with activists on the island are 
indispensable. The belief that political change is likely to 
emerge from within Cuba is widespread in the diaspora. Surveys 
have shown that over time a greater percentage has come to 
believe that transition will be led by leaders living inside 
Cuba, not those living outside the island, and not by Washington 
either. 
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 Political variegation in Cuban Miami is clearly expressed 
in popular attitudes and electoral behavior. Over time public 
opinion has become more diverse and nuanced. Support for the 
embargo has eroded from an overwhelming majority to less than 
half of the Cuban Americans surveyed in 2008.20 At the same time 
the percentage of Cuban Americans supporting diplomatic 
contacts, cultural engagement, travel to the island to visit 
friends and relatives, legalization of remittances, humanitarian 
aid, and commercial transactions between the United States and 
Cuba has increased dramatically. Age and years in the United 
States explain much of the variation and shift in attitudes: 
younger Cuban Americans advocate flexible approaches as do 
recent arrivals from the island to South Florida. The latter are 
committed to maintaining ties with loved ones, and they wish to 
visit them and assist them by sending remittances. In this 
sense, they are acting similarly to other Latin American 
migrants. And like other Latino voters, Cuban Americans are 
questioning their traditional support for the Republican Party. 
Party affiliation among younger Cuban Americans and recently 
naturalized citizens is experiencing important reorientation. 
Fewer Cuban Americans than before are identifying with the 
Republican Party, and more are opting to declare themselves 
Independent.21 
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 Although the electoral politics of Cuban Americans is still 
dominated by earlier exiles who are naturalized U.S. citizens, 
the trend manifesting among the more recently naturalized 
citizens represents a significant challenge to the grip of the 
Republican Party over this influential group of voters. While 
the majority of Cuban American voters continues to identify 
itself as conservative (despite a small decrease in that 
identification), the conservative label hides liberal (and 
Democrat-like) preferences. Deeper analyses have revealed that 
Cuban American Republicans espouse positions in the areas of 
social welfare and health that render them anything but staunch 
conservatives. They resemble Democrats in their political 
preferences on key domestic issues, which is not at all 
surprising if one understands Cuba’s progressive political 
culture. 
 What continues to connect Cuban Americans to the 
Republicans is an effective party machine and the belief that 
Republicans are tougher in international affairs and hence more 
likely to take a strong stance against the Castro brothers. 
However, even in these two areas serious fissures are 
developing, specifically because younger voters are not voting 
based on Cuba-centered issues and because the harsh words of the 
George W. Bush administration toward the Cuban government were 
not matched by deeds.22 On the contrary, trade with Cuba 
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increased despite the opposition of Cuban American Republicans. 
The Republican Party is split between competing constituencies: 
businessmen seeking markets and Cuban Americans opposing 
commercial relations with the island. The chasm is unresolved. 
On the contrary, as decisions about dealing with Cuba are made 
in the future, these irreconcilable differences will tend to 
push both sides farther apart. 
<a>The Failure of Old Politics 
<txt>In no small measure changes within the Cuban American 
community are the result of the failure of the traditional 
policies that both Washington and Miami have advocated in 
relation to Cuba. The embargo and the host of policies intended 
to exert pressure on the Cuban government have not produced the 
desired outcomes of democratic change. With time the peoples on 
both sides of the Florida Straits have encountered each other 
and have found a wellspring of connection amidst the political 
divide. Human connections resulting from family travel and 
limited but impactful cultural engagement have provided new 
sources of politics at the subnational level. The reencounters 
of the Cuban people have laid the foundation for a revised set 
of political assumptions that have redefined the politics of 
Cuban Miami. The process started in the mid-{#}to late 1970s 
when President Jimmy Carter eased travel restrictions. What 
later, under President Clinton, became known as the “people to 
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people” policy contributed to a reencounter of Cubans in and 
outside the island that has not been mediated exclusively by the 
politics of revolutionary polarization. Pope John Paul II’s trip 
to the island in 1996 also legitimized travel to the island for 
religious (and often conservative) Cubans in the diaspora.23 The 
pope, in a symbolic move, opened a moral door to the island. 
From then on relations between Catholic parishes have been 
strengthened. Travel to the island allows for the discovery of a 
vibrant society that exists within the parameters of a one-party 
system and the human connection beyond political litmus tests. 
Moreover, suffering has brought Cubans together. The precipitous 
decline of the Cuban economy in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
pulled at the heartstrings of Cuban Americans. Remittances 
flowed to the island, reaching up to one billion dollars 
according to some observers. Humanitarian aid was also sent to 
the island after natural disasters. 
 The failure of the old politics has also challenged 
political organizations and different U.S. administrations to 
search for alternative policies, which helps explain the changes 
in political choices of institutions such as CANF. In part, the 
choices were made possible by an altered political landscape in 
Cuba, specifically the genesis of civil society represented by 
human rights, dissident, and opposition groups. 
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 By 2009--the fiftieth anniversary of the Cuban Revolution--
changes within and without the Cuban American community put into 
question the future of its effective power over U.S. policy on 
Cuba and the policy’s multiple components. A new administration 
in Washington is a harbinger of at least changes around the 
edges of the policies. President Obama not only has a different 
worldview than that of President Reagan and Bush, he has clearly 
positioned himself in a more flexible spot regarding the future 
of relations with the island. While additional changes are 
expected, within the first six months of his administration he 
delivered on one of his campaign promises, to make travel and 
remittances to Cuba by Cuban Americans much easier.24 Moreover, 
President Obama owes little to the conservative side in the 
Cuban American community, which did not vote for him. Rather, he 
needs to reward those younger and more progressive Cuban 
Americans that supported his election. 
 With the advent of the Obama administration there has been 
the beginning of an important realignment in the convergence of 
the presidential worldview with that of Cuban Americans in Miami 
who favor a new action plan vis-à-vis the island. But to expect 
that ideological commonality between the president and a sector 
of the Cuban American population will in and of itself transform 
U.S. policy is unrealistic. Despite how influential Cuban 
Americans have been in the past, they have never been the sole 
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actors--and in the absence of Cuban Americans, the United States 
would continue to find raisons d’état to try to isolate and 
pressure Cuba. Even in times of close ideological convergence 
between the White House and CANF, President Reagan took actions 
that did not prompt with the organization’s blessing.5 The 
Clinton administration--which had crafted a shrewd two-track 
policy toward Cuba (hard on the government, soft on the people) 
that found considerable support among Cubans in Miami--decided 
to return to his father in Cuba Elián González, the six year-old 
boy who survived a shipwreck in the Florida Straits while 
attempting to flee the island with his mother. This was a 
decision that the majority of Cuban Americans rejected.25 In 
short, convergence with the presidential worldview is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for an ethnic group to 
influence U.S. foreign affairs. 
 Diversity within the community in terms of political 
preferences as well as the multiplicity of Cuban American lobby 
groups on the Hill will tend to erode the influence of the group 
as competing interests might cancel each other. In recent years, 
three institutionalized tendencies are operating: a reformed 
CANF (lobbying for a modicum of changes in travel and a more 
critically engaged policy), the Cuban Liberty Council (the 
conservative splinter group from CANF which continues to lobby 
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for the maintenance of the embargo and travel restrictions), and 
the Cuba Study Group (which advocates a multilateral policy of 
engagement with Cuba). 
 Concurrent with the changes, a level of continuity is 
discernible among the Cuban American members of Congress, all of 
whom carry considerable influence over this issue and all of 
whom advocate for toeing a tough line vis-à-vis Havana. The gap 
between the officials representing Cuban Americans in Washington 
and the popular attitudes on the ground has widened. 
Congressional representatives espouse policy preferences that 
seem divorced from the real if subtle variations occurring 
within communities of Cuban origin. With the incorporation, 
through naturalization, of more recent arrivals into the 
electoral system, the tendency will be for the gap between 
elected officials and the grassroots to close. The congressional 
races in November 2008 were the first truly competitive ones in 
which the Cuban American community participated in the past 
decades. Longstanding Republican incumbents were given a run for 
their money by Democratic rivals who, among other policy 
differences, advocated for a different approach to Cuba. 
 With the emergence of new political actors from within the 
Cuban American community, the recent entrance of business 
interests into the debate over relations with Cuba (and the 
pressure within the Republican Party to accommodate the requests 
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from farming constituencies in particular) represents one of the 
single most important factors in the future redefinition of U.S. 
policy. During the eight years of the Bush administration, the 
United States became one of the island’s top trading partners.26 
Due to geographic proximity, commercial relations are bound to 
increase over time. The politics of the dollar are here to stay. 
<a>MiHavana or HavanaMia: The Emergence of a New Economic, 
Cultural, and Political Geography 
<txt>While both the Obama and the Raúl Castro administrations are 
skittish (for different reasons) about moving steadily down a 
path to diplomatic normalization, in the short to medium term 
one can expect a thaw in terms of greater flexibility of 
cultural and educational travel. Regardless of the timing of an 
official rapprochement, subnational forces are pushing to create 
a condition of normalcy between the two nations, led in some 
important ways by Cuban Americans in Miami. No other community 
in the United States is so intimately engaged with Cuba on an 
everyday basis as are Cuban Americans (they travel, they call, 
they e-mail, they send money transfers, they keep abreast of 
developments inside the island). No other city in the United 
States is so connected to Havana and the island as is Miami. 
Flights to Havana take off every day from Miami International 
Airport. During any week, Cuban artists are performing or 
exhibiting their work. In Miami, Cuba matters. With time, the 
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patterns of change evident in the Cuban American community 
indicate the coming of a new day for Cuban-U.S. relations. That 
day will be marked by new politics, less passion, more 
affection, and more dollars--with similarities, perhaps, to a 
well-established old marriage. 
 Despite the embargo, dollars are flowing between the United 
States and Cuba through state-to-state channels as well as 
subnational ones. Trade has increased dramatically in the past 
several years, and remittances to the island have continued to 
flow, if at a decreased rate due to Bush administration 
restrictions and the economic crisis in the United States. With 
the rise of economic linkages and transnational networks, a new 
economic and political geography is in the making.27 
Transnational connections based on love, kinship, humanitarian 
concerns, religion, professional affiliation, and cultural 
interests are being strengthened. Official bilateral cooperation 
on a number of issues (immigration, weather, drug interdiction) 
continues to take place. Both serve to create a baseline for 
confidence building and greater collaboration in areas of mutual 
interest. 
 I foresee the day when Miami and Havana are the bicoastal 
cities leading a hub of economic, social, and cultural 
connectivity. Bonds based on love, money, and culture will 
create dynamics that bring these two cities together, contouring 
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a new functional geography marked by connection rather than 
disconnection. This new sociocultural, economic, and 
transnational political subregion--call it MiHavana or HavanaMia 
(depending on which coast you are standing on)--will operate in 
an integrated fashion reestablishing a new borderline.28 
Commerce, tourism, arts, families, and ideas will travel freely 
back and forth between the shores, connecting two cities, two 
centers of population and two nations.29 But not all will be 
happiness in this dawning day. The emergence of a new regional 
geography brings with it the potential for economic growth and 
social mobility. In the process, some will benefit but others 
will not. Inequality will rise.30 The politics of the dollar 
makes friends and enemies as well. The future of U.S.-Cuban 
relations will tend to be that of intimate but contentious 
partners. The role that Cuban Americans will play in MiHavana 
will contribute both to the intimacy and the contention. 
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